# FISCAL POLICY AND THE ETHNO-RACIAL DIVIDE IN BOLIVIA, BRAZIL, GUATEMALA AND URUGUAY

Presented by Nora Lustig
Tulane University; CGD and IAD

Lustig, Nora. 2014. "Fiscal Policy and the Ethno-Racial Divide in Bolivia, Brazil, Guatemala and Uruguay." *CEQ Working Paper No. 22*, Center for Inter-American Policy and Research and Department of Economics, Tulane University and Inter-American Dialogue.

CEQ-IDB Incidence of Taxes and Social Spending by Ethnicity and Race
May 12, 2014 – Washington, DC

# Acknowledgements


- This report was prepared as part of the Gender and Diversity Division of the Inter-American Development Bank-Commitment to Equity project (CEQ) project. Launched in 2008, the CEQ is a joint initiative of the Center for Inter-American Policy and Research and the Department of Economics, Tulane University and the Inter-American Dialogue www.commitmentoequity.org.
- Judith Morrison gave superb guidance to the project throughout. I am grateful to Ana Lucia Iturriza and Eliana Rubiano for their excellent support in the coordination of the project. I also wish to thank Jacob Edelman, David Roberts and Adam Ratzlaff for their excellent research assistantship. Last but not least, I am grateful to Ariel Fiszbein, Andrew Morrison and participants of the November 21, 2013 seminar at the Inter-American Development Bank for very useful comments and feedback on an earlier draft.

CEQ COMMITMENT TO EQUITY

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## What is CEQ

The Commitment to Equity (CEQ) was designed to analyze the impact of taxation and social spending on inequality and poverty in individual countries, and provide a roadmap for governments, multilateral institutions, and nongovernmental organizations in their efforts to build more equitable societies. Directed by **Nora Lustig**, the CEQ is a joint project of CIPR and the Department of Economics at Tulane University and the Inter-American Dialogue.

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

Handbook and Diagnostic Questionaire

# Fiscal Incidence Analysis by Ethnicity and Race: Teams

- **CEQ Director:** Nora Lustig
- **Bolivia**: Veronica Paz Arauco, George Gray-Molina, Wilson Jimenez and Ernesto Yañez
- **Brazil**: Sean Higgins and Claudiney Pereira
- **Guatemala**: Maynor Cabrera, Nora Lustig and Hilcias E. Moran
- **Uruguay:** Marisa Bucheli, Maximo Rossi and Florencia Amabile.

# Summary of Paper

- Afrodescendants and indigenous groups in Latin America have higher poverty rates and are disproportionately represented among the poor
- Using comparable fiscal incidence analyses for Bolivia, Brazil, Guatemala and Uruguay, analyzes how much poverty and inequality of opportunity change after direct and indirect taxes, cash transfers, social spending and subsidies
- **Conclusion:** taxes and transfers reduce the ethno-racial divide but slightly, with the exception—perhaps-- of Uruguay
- Proposes indicators of progressivity and pro-poorness in the ethno-racial space
- Explores which elements of the tax and transfer systems within each country specifically contribute to narrowing or increasing the ethno-racial gaps.

# Outline

- **The Ethno-Racial Divide**
- **Incidence Analysis: Methodological Highlights**
- **Incidence Analysis by Ethnic and Racial Groups: Indicators**
  - Measuring the ethno-racial divide
  - Defining progressivity and pro-poorness in the ethno-racial space
- **Main Results**
  - Fiscal Policy, Inequality and Poverty in the Ethno-Racial Space
  - Fiscal Policy: Progressivity and Pro-poorness in the Ethno-Racial Space

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# Inequality, Poverty, Education by Ethnicity and Race: Bolivia, Brazil, Guatemala and Uruguya

- Per capita income of the white population is between sixty percent higher to twice as high as the per capita income of the nonwhite population
- Inequality between ethnic or racial groups accounts for between 1 percent of total inequality in Uruguay to a maximum of 9.1 percent in Brazil
- The probability of being poor (measured by the headcount ratio with the international poverty line of $2.50 in purchasing power parity dollars per day) is between two and three times higher for the nonwhites.
- Schooling is roughly between two and three years lower for the nonwhite population in all four countries.

# INEQUALITY

| Indicator | Bolivia (2009) | Brazil (2009) | Guatemala (2009/10) | Uruguay (2009) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| White/Nonwhite Average Per Capita Market Income* | 1.6 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 1.8 |
| Theil Index (in %) | 49.7 | 67.4 | 69.2 | 45.6 |
| Contribution of Between Race ** (in %) | 4.9 | 9.1 | 8.5 | 1 |

Source: Author's calculation based on Bolivia (2009): Paz-Arauco et al., 2013 CEQ-IDB; Brazil (2009): Higgins and Pereira, 2013 CEQ-IDB; Guatemala (2010/2011): Cabrera and Moran, 2013 CEQ-IDB; Uruguay (2009): Bucheli, Rossi and Amabile, 2013 CEQ-IDB.

Note: All these measures use *pre-fisc* or market income, defined as gross wages and salaries, income from capital, private transfers and contributory pensions; it includes self-consumption (except for Bolivia) and imputed rent for owner's occupied housing. *The nonwhite population for Bolivia and Guatemala refer to the indigenous population; in the case of Brazil, to the *pardo* population; and, in the case of Uruguay, to the afro-descendants. **This corresponds to the "between" component of a standard decomposition of the Theil index.

# POVERTY

## Share of Total Population; Share of Poor Population; Headcount Ratio White/Nonwhites (in %)




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# EDUCATION

## Average Years of Schooling Whites/Nonwhites




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# Suppose you want to know…

- What is the impact of taxes and government transfers on poverty and inequality in the ethno-racial space?

- How progressive are taxes and public spending in the ethno-racial space?

- How pro-disadvantaged groups is the fiscal system?

# Basic elements of standard fiscal incidence

- Before taxes and transfers income of unit *h, or* $I_h$
- Taxes $T_i$
  - personal income taxes; contributions to social security
  - consumption and production taxes and subsidies
- Transfers $R_i$
  - social spending: cash & near-cash transfers; in-kind transfers (education and health)
  - consumption and production (agriculture) subsidies
- "Allocators" of tax *i* and transfer *j* to unit *h*, or $S_{ih}$ , $S_{jh}$ (the share of tax *i* borne or transfer *j received* by unit *h*)
- Post-taxes and transfers income of unit h ($Y_h$) is:

$$Y_h = I_h - \sum_i T_i S_{ih} + \sum_j R_j S_{jh}$$


TRANSFERS
Market Income = $I^m$
wages and salaries, income from capital, private transfers; before government taxes, social security contributions and transfers; benchmark (sensitivity analysis) includes (doesn't include) contributory pensions
TAXES
−
Personal income taxes and employee contributions to social security (only contributions that are not directed to pensions, in the benchmark case)
Net Market Income = $I^n$
+
Direct transfers
Disposable Income = $I^d$
+
Indirect subsidies
−
Indirect taxes
Post-fiscal Income = $I^{pf}$
In-kind transfers (free or subsidized government services in education and health)
+
−
Co-payments, user fees
Final Income = $I^f$

# Commitment to Equity Assessments (CEQ)

- Accounting Approach: no behavioral, no general equilibrium effects and no intertemporal effects
- Point-in-time
- Comprehensive standard fiscal incidence analysis of current systems
- Harmonized definitions and methodological approaches to facilitate cross-country comparisons
- Uses income per capita as the welfare indicator
- Allocators vary => full transparency in the method used for each category, tax shifting assumptions, etc.
- Mainly average incidence; a few cases with marginal incidence

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# Table 2 – Fiscal Policy Outcome Indicators and the Ethno-Racial Divide

| Outcome | Indicator |
|---|---|
| **Inequality** | White/nonwhite average per capita market vs. disposable income |
| | Decomposable inequality measure (e.g., Theil index) for market income vs. disposable income |
| | Contribution of between race inequality to overall inequality for market income vs. disposable income |
| **Inequality of Opportunity** | Smoothed inequality measure over circumstances, including ethnicity or race as one of them (e.g., Mean Log Deviation) for market income vs. disposable income |
| **Poverty** | Headcount ratio of white and nonwhite population for market income vs. disposable income |

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# Definitions of Progressivity: Taxes

- Progressive: proportion paid rises with income
- Regressive: proportion paid declines with income
- Neutral: proportion paid coincides with distribution of market (pre-fiscal) income

# Definitions of Progressivity: Transfers

- Progressive: proportion received declines with income
  - In relative terms: ditto
  - In absolute terms: per capita received declines with income => pro-poor
  - Neutral in absolute terms: per capita is equal for everybody
- Regressive: proportion received increases with income
- Neutral: proportion received coincides with distribution of market (pre-fiscal) income


1
0
0
1
Cumulative proportion of benefits, taxes or income
Cumulative proportion of population (ordered by market income)
transfer: progressive in absolute terms
45 degree line;
transfer: neutral in absolute terms
tax: upper bound of regressive
transfer: progressive
in relative terms;
tax: regressive
transfer: regressive;
tax: progressive
market income Lorenz curve;
transfer or tax: neutral in relative terms

# Table 3 – Indicators of Progressivity, Pro-poorness and Horizontal Equity in the Ethno-Racial Divide

| Dimension of Fiscal System | Indicator |
|---|---|
| **Progressivity** | Share of taxes (transfers) paid (received) by each ethnic or racial group compared to the respective shares of market income and population |
| **Pro-poorness** | Probability of escaping poverty (impoverishment) by ethnic or racial group<br><br>Coverage of services by income category for each ethnic or racial group |

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


Lustig, N. "Consumption Taxes, Inequality and the Poor." CEQ Working Paper No. 23, Center for Inter-American Policy and Research and Department of Economics, Tulane University and Inter-American Dialogue.

# Summary

- What is the impact of direct taxes and direct transfers on ethnic and racial inequality?
  - Not much
  - Although all the indicators move in the right direction, with the exception of the headcount ratio in Uruguay, the change is quite small

**Table 4 – Ethno-racial Divide Before (Market Income) and After (Disposable Income) Taxes and Transfers: Bolivia, Brazil, Guatemala and Uruguay**

| Indicator | Bolivia | | Brazil | | Guatemala | | Uruguay | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Market Income | Disposable Income | Market Income | Disposable Income | Market Income | Disposable Income | Market Income | Disposable Income |
| White/nonwhite average per capita income* | 1.6 | 1.5 | 2.1 | 2 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 1.7 |
| Theil Index | .497 | .478 | .674 | .588 | .692 | .682 | .456 | .389 |
| Contribution of between race inequality*** (in %) | 4.9 | 4.8 | 9.1 | 9.2 | 8.5 | 8.3 | 1 | .96 |
| Inequality of opportunity**** | 0.092 | 0.082 | 0.096 | 0.083 | 0.197 | 0.195 | 0.013 | 0.011 |
| Headcount ratio of white population** (in %) | 10.1 | 9.1 | 8.2 | 5.6 | 24.5 | 24 | 4.8 | 1.4 |
| Headcount ratio of nonwhite population**(in %) | 27.7 | 24.8 | 22.1 | 16.7 | 52.6 | 50.1 | 12.4 | 3.7 |

**Source: Author's based on Bolivia (2009): Paz-Arauco et al., 2013 CEQ-IDB; Brazil (2009): Higgins and Pereira, 2013 CEQ-IDB; Guatemala (2010/2011): Cabrera and Moran, 2013 CEQ-IDB; Uruguay (2009): Bucheli, Rossi and Amabile, 2013 CEQ-IDB.**

# The ratio of average per capita incomes by ethnicity or race declines by at most one decimal point (Bolivia, Brazil and Uruguay) to nothing (Guatemala) …



# The contribution of the between-race component changes by a very small and it actually increases for Brazil …



# Inequality of opportunity also declines by a relatively small amount…



# The difference in headcount ratios by ethnic group and race after taxes and transfers is still very large, with the exception of Uruguay…



**More importantly, when one adds the effect of consumption taxes, the gap in the headcount ratio increases above that for market income in Brazil (!) and remains unchanged in Bolivia….**

| Difference in Headcount Ratio in Percentage Points | Market Income | Disposable Income | Post-fiscal Income |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bolivia | 17.6 | 15.7 | 17.6 |
| Brazil | 13.9 | 11.1 | 14.4 |
| Guatemala | 28.1 | 26.1 | 27.2 |
| Uruguay | 7.6 | 2.3 | 3.1 |

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# Progressivity: Bolivia

- Transfers are progressive in absolute terms in the ethno-racial space (i.e., shares are higher for the nonwhite population than its population share), they are not progressive enough.
  - The share of noncontributory pensions, CCTs and other direct transfers going to the indigenous population is lower than their share in the total poor population.
- Consumption taxes are slightly regressive in the ethno-racial space: the indigenous population pays a higher share of taxes than their share in total market income (different cons. baskets?)

# Title




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Note: Poverty is measured with the international poverty line of US$2.50 ppp per day.

# Progressivity: Brazil

- Direct transfers are progressive in absolute terms in the ethno-racial space but not progressive enough
  - The very progressive CCT *Bolsa Familia* is partially offset by the Special Circumstances Pensions, neutral in the ethno-racial space (that is, the share of the transfer is practically the same as the share of market income), and, by Scholarships, which are regressive

**In fact, the poorest white population receives almost twice as much in direct transfers than the equally poor nonwhites …**

# Progressivity: Guatemala

- Overall, taxes and cash transfers in Guatemala are "pro-indigenous"
  - But the amount that is redistributed in cash to either ethnic group is very small and some of the individual transfers are more "pro-nonindigenous"
  - The progressive CCT is partially offset by the regressivity of indirect subsidies; noncontributory pensions and other transfers are progressive only in relative terms

# In contrast to Brazil, however, in GUA the incidence of transfers is higher for the indigenous population …



# In Guatemala, poverty reduction due to government transfers is small for both the nonindigenous and indigenous population …



# Progressivity: Uruguay

- Narrows the difference in the headcount ratio of the white and nonwhite population the most
- The ex-post disposable income headcount ratios are quite low and quite similar
- This is no coincidence: higher per capita income, lower overall inequality and considerably lower poverty rates than the other three
- Also, nonwhites are a smaller share of the total and the poor population than in other countries

# Uruguay: Headcount Ratio by Race (in %)



# Progressivity: Uruguay

- Its fiscal policy is significantly more progressive in the ethno-racial space
- Direct taxes are progressive
- Direct transfers as a whole and item by item are progressive in absolute terms in the ethno-racial space

# Probability of Escaping Poverty Through Direct Transfers (in percent)

- If the goal were to equalize the disposable income poverty of the disadvantaged group to the market income poverty of the non-disadvantaged group, the probability of escaping poverty for the nonwhite population would have to be
  - 63 percent in Bolivia and Brazil
  - 61.4 percent for Uruguay => ONLY where actual is higher
  - 53 percent for Guatemala

# Probability of Escaping Poverty Through Direct Transfers (in percent)

| | Bolivia | Brazil | Guatemala | Uruguay |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| National | 10.4 | 27.2 | 4.3 | 71.5 |
| White | 10.1 | 33.4 | 2.9 | 71.6 |
| Non-White | 10.4 | 25.0 | 5.2 | 73.5 |

If the goal were to equalize the disposable income poverty of the disadvantaged group to the market income poverty of the non-disadvantaged group, the probability of escaping poverty for the nonwhite population would have to be 63 percent in Bolivia and Brazil, 61.4 percent in Uruguay and 53 percent in Guatemala

# Use of Tertiary Education and Health Services by Market Income Category and Ethno-Racial Group (in percent)

- Use of tertiary education is considerably lower for afrodescendants and indigenous groups in all four countries
- Use of health services varies by country but nonwhites use the contributory system less than whites (rural areas and informal sector).

# Use of Tertiary Education Services by Market Income Category and Ethno-Racial Group (in percent)

| Education for Tertiary Aged Students | | Net Enrollment Rates by Income Group and Ethnic Group | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Bolivia** | **Groups:** | y < 1.25 | 1.25 < y < 2.5 | 2.5 < y < 4 | 4 < y < 10 | 10 < y < 50 | y > 50 | Total |
| Non-Indigenous | | 26.3% | 26.7% | 26.5% | 28.6% | 28.4% | 65.0% | 28.8% |
| Indigenous | | 2.3% | 2.3% | 12.0% | 18.9% | 24.0% | 0.0% | 15.5% |
| **Brazil** | **Groups:** | y < 1.25 | 1.25 < y < 2.5 | 2.5 < y < 4 | 4 < y < 10 | 10 < y < 50 | y > 50 | Total |
| White | | 6.9% | 3.1% | 2.9% | 4.8% | 11.1% | 33.2% | 9.0% |
| Pardo | | 1.0% | 1.6% | 1.7% | 3.5% | 9.0% | 15.2% | 4.4% |
| Black | | 2.5% | 0.5% | 1.7% | 2.2% | 7.3% | 5.0% | 3.3% |
| Indigenous | | 0.7% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.5% | 0.0% | 0.4% |
| **Guatemala** | **Groups:** | y < 1.25 | 1.25 < y < 2.5 | 2.5 < y < 4 | 4 < y < 10 | 10 < y < 50 | y > 50 | Total |
| Non-Indigenous | | 0.8% | 0.4% | 2.1% | 5.7% | 16.8% | 2.9% | 5.6% |
| Indigenous | | 0.3% | 0.8% | 1.3% | 3.8% | 14.2% | 0.0% | 1.8% |
| **Uruguay** | **Groups:** | y < 1.25 | 1.25 < y < 2.5 | 2.5 < y < 4 | 4 < y < 10 | 10 < y < 50 | y > 50 | Total |
| White | | 1.2% | 0.9% | 2.6% | 6.9% | 28.2% | 59.9% | 21.9% |
| Afro-Descendant | | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.8% | 1.7% | 11.9% | 16.7% | 5.1% |
| Indigenous | | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 2.6% | 14.8% | 100.0% | 9.0% |

Source: Author's calculation based on Bolivia (2009): Paz-Arauco et al., 2013 CEQ-IDB; Brazil (2009): Higgins and Pereira, 2013 CEQ-IDB; Guatemala (2010/2011): Cabrera and Moran, 2013 CEQ-IDB; Uruguay (2009): Bucheli, Rossi and Amabile, 2013 CEQ-IDB.

Note: income categories are measured in ppp and are based on Ferreira et al. (2012).

**Title:**

Table 9 -- Coverage of Public Health Services by Market Income Category and Ethno-Racial Group (in percent)

| | | Health Coverage Rates by Ethnic Group and Income Group | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Bolivia** | **Groups:** | y < 1.25 | 1.25 < y < 2.5 | 2.5 < y < 4 | 4 < y < 10 | 10 < y < 50 | y > 50 | Total |
| Non-Indigenous | Public Health System | 57.98% | 50.80% | 57.74% | 48.27% | 29.44% | 22.43% | 42.83% |
| Non-Indigenous | Contributory Public Health Insurance | 2.13% | 0.99% | 9.64% | 5.83% | 10.66% | 2.66% | 7.46% |
| Indigenous | Public Health System | 54.9% | 41.5% | 45.0% | 42.8% | 28.4% | 9.0% | 41.7% |
| Indigenous | Contributory Public Health Insurance | 0.1% | 1.0% | 3.0% | 5.1% | 11.6% | 7.4% | 4.9% |
| **Brazil** | **Groups:** | y < 1.25 | 1.25 < y < 2.5 | 2.5 < y < 4 | 4 < y < 10 | 10 < y < 50 | y > 50 | Total |
| White | Health | 10.9% | 17.1% | 19.4% | 26.8% | 33.7% | 40.5% | 29.6% |
| Pardo | Health | 7.9% | 15.7% | 20.6% | 26.5% | 31.0% | 32.9% | 23.8% |
| Black | Health | 9.2% | 15.7% | 20.4% | 28.7% | 35.1% | 28.1% | 26.4% |
| Indigenous | Health | 33.9% | 27.6% | 25.8% | 24.3% | 19.8% | 3.5% | 23.8% |
| **Guatemala** | **Groups:** | y < 1.25 | 1.25 < y < 2.5 | 2.5 < y < 4 | 4 < y < 10 | 10 < y < 50 | y > 50 | Total |
| Non-Indigenous | Health | 92.42% | 92.20% | 92.31% | 91.26% | 86.46% | 78.71% | 90.82% |
| Non-Indigenous | Noncontributory | 94.74% | 95.32% | 96.03% | 95.42% | 91.55% | 93.35% | 94.80% |
| Non-Indigenous | Social Security | 2.93% | 13.35% | 23.38% | 48.29% | 64.30% | 61.73% | 37.15% |
| Indigenous | Health | 96.53% | 92.53% | 90.58% | 83.61% | 54.42% | 12.87% | 89.73% |
| Indigenous | Noncontributory | 97.42% | 94.23% | 93.63% | 89.82% | 60.24% | 12.87% | 92.64% |
| Indigenous | Social Security | 3.03% | 6.36% | 14.82% | 27.38% | 40.82% | | 13.08% |
| **Uruguay** | **Groups:** | y < 1.25 | 1.25 < y < 2.5 | 2.5 < y < 4 | 4 < y < 10 | 10 < y < 50 | y > 50 | Total |
| White | Health | 98.6% | 98.8% | 98.6% | 97.9% | 89.5% | 77.8% | 91.9% |
| Afro-Descendant | Health | 97.8% | 97.3% | 99.0% | 97.9% | 95.2% | 93.6% | 97.0% |
| Indigenous | Health | 100.0% | 100.0% | 99.0% | 97.5% | 93.4% | 94.7% | 95.8% |

Thank you